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COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS AND FORMER
TESTIMONY IN NEW YORK AND FEDERAL
COURTS WITH SOME COMMENTS ON
CODIFICATION
Hon. George C. Pratt:
We move on at this point. Our next speaker is Professor
Randolph Jonakait of New York Law School. His subject is the
admissibility of coconspirator statements under New York and
federal law. Federal law, I think he will tell you very soon, says
they all come in. I suspect New York is more restrictive, but let's
see.
Professor Randolph N. Jonakait*:
Thank you, Judge. It is unusual to be introduced by a judge.
Usually, when I speak in the presence of judges they are saying,
I have heard enough counselor, sit down.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
That comes later.
Professor Randolph N. Jonakait:
I. CODIFICATION
Before I get into my scheduled topic, I wish to comment briefly
about evidentiary codification since that seems to be an emerging
focus today. I have been identified as an opponent of the
codification of New York's evidence law. 1 That is somewhat
* Professor Randolph N. Jonakait is a Professor at New York Law
School.
1. Or at least Professor Salken has so identified me. See Barbara C.
Salken, To Codify or Not to Codif-That is the Question: A Study of New
1
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misleading. I did oppose the draft rules promulgated in the early
eighties, but not simply because there was an attempt to codify. I
did not like that particular proposed code. That draft closely
followed the Federal Rules of Evidence. Much is wrong, I
believe, with the Rules and how they have been interpreted. 2 I do
not believe that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be the
unbending model for New York.
The more recent draft, however, is different. It really is an
attempt to codify New York law and gives more opportunity for
future growth in evidence law.3 Many of my reasons for
opposition have melted away.
Still, I believe that the benefits of codification are usually
overstated. Seldom does a code truly give an answer to an
important evidence issue. For example, a code can define
hearsay, but I doubt that any of us can truly understand hearsay
just from reading that definition. Instead, almost all of us need to
go far beyond that definition, and we end up reading the same
cases, treatises, and articles that we would read if no code
existed. 4 Perhaps we can never expect definitive answers to
important evidentiary questions in any one place, but useful
answers are more likely to be found in case law than in a code.
York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641, 696 n.332
(1992) (stating that "Jonakait ... [is] a long time opponent of codification").
2. Some of my concerns are expressed in Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEx.
L. REV. 745 (1990).
3. See, e.g., T14E NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A
CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 102 (1991). The
proposed rule states in pertinent part:
This chapter shall not be construed to have changed settled decisional
law or statutory principles of evidence unless there is an express and
unequivocal indication of legislative intent to do so. That intent is not to
be found simply because a provision of this chapter is phrased in
language that is different from settled decisional law or statutes.
Id.
4. This is true not just for the hearsay definition, but for most of the
evidentiary rules that are at the core of important disputes. Thus, while other
crime evidence is highly litigated, the language of the applicable federal
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A few words in defense of the New York Court of Appeals
also seem in order. It is true that the court of appeals has not
reformed some archaic evidentiary principles that a code would
change. On the other hand, New York's highest court has
produced path-breaking evidentiary decisions. Two brilliant
examples quickly come to mind: People v. Taylor,5 which
considers the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence and
People v. Hughes,6 which considers the admissibility of
hypnotically-enhanced testimony. Both of these decisions have
been widely discussed and followed in other jurisdictions. 7
Perhaps, more to the point here is that if New York had adopted
the proposed code based on the Federal Rules of Evidence when
it was promulgated and interpreted it as the Supreme Court has
interpreted the federal rules, then the New York Court of
Appeals could not have decided Hughes as it did, and perhaps not
Taylor either. A code can bring advances, but a code can also
impede progress.
II. COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS
What I did come more prepared to speak about today,
however, was two hearsay exceptions, how they differ between
5. 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1990).
6. 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 445 (4th Cir. 1986)
(citing People v. Hughes as standing for proposition that hypnotically-enhanced
testimony is inadmissible due to the fact that it is unreliable and damaging to
the fact-finding process); Clay v. Vose, 599 F. Supp. 1505, 1518 (D. Mass.
1984) (suggesting that People v. Hughes provides the prevailing view that "[al
person under hypnosis is extremely susceptible to the suggestions he perceives
are emanating from the hypnotist and thus such testimony from that person is
unreliable"); State v. Martens, 629 N.E.2d 462, 467 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(finding the New York Court of Appeals decision in People v. Taylor to be
persuasive with regard to the admissibility of expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome to explain the victim's reaction after the incident).
3
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the courts of New York and the Second Circuit, and some of
their interplay with the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 8
Coconspirator statements are admissible in federal court when a
defendant's coconspirator makes a statement during the
conspiracy and in furtherance of it.9 The Supreme Court has held
that an anti-bootstrapping provision cannot be read into this
provision.10 Thus, in deciding whether a conspiracy existed and
whether the declarant and the accused were members of it, the
trial judge can consider the proffered statement itself. 1
While New York admits coconspirator statements when made
during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, New York clearly
differs from federal law by prohibiting bootstrapping. As the
New York Court of Appeals has recently affirmed, a trial court
cannot consider the challenged out-of-court statement in
determining whether a conspiracy existed. 12
New York diverges even further away from the federal
coconspirator doctrine. 13 In People v. Sanders, 14 the New
York Court of Appeals held that even though declarations of one
coconspirator made in the course of and in furtherance of a
8. I have explored differences between New York and federal evidence
law more comprehensively in RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT ET AL., NEW YORK
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS (1993 & Supp. 1994).
9. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The rule provides: "A statement is not
hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy." Id.
10. See Bouraily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987) (ruling that
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence, "a court, in making a
preliminary factual determination under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), may examine the
hearsay statements sought to be admitted").
11. Id.
12. See People v. Bac Tran, 80 N.Y.2d 170, 179, 603 N.E.2d 950, 955,
589 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850 (1992) (affirming that "the determination whether a
prima facie case of conspiracy has been established must be made without
recourse to the declarations sought to be introduced"); see also People v.
Salko, 47 N.Y.2d 230, 391 N.E.2d 976, 417 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1979).
13. The following discussion about the New York coconspirator exception
is largely drawn from the 1994 cumulative supplement to JONAKAIT ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 41-44.
14. 56 N.Y.2d 51, 436 N.E.2d 480, 451 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1982).
[Vol 11
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conspiracy may be admissible against all other coconspirators as
an exception to the general rule against hearsay, the confrontation
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
15
and Article I, Section 6 of the New York Constitution 16 may
require additional elements before coconspirator statements can
be admitted against a criminal defendant. 17
The court relied on Ohio v. Roberts,18 which held that hearsay
from a person not testifying at trial could be admitted into a
criminal case, consistently with the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause, only if the declarant was unavailable and
the hearsay either fell into a well-established hearsay exception or
otherwise had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 19
Sanders, after referring to Roberts, stated:
Although the coconspirators' exception has been part of the
settled law of this State for quite some time... we need not and
do not adopt in this case a rule by which every extrajudicial
statement qualifying under this exception to the hearsay rule is
admissible at a criminal trial notwithstanding the constitutional
right of confrontation.20
Without specifically defining what limitations the confrontation
guarantee does place on coconspirator statements in New York,
the New York Court of Appeals held that the disputed hearsay at
issue was properly admitted since the declarant was unavailable
and the hearsay had appropriate indicia of reliability.
2 1
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause provides in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him.. .. "Id.
16. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. The provision states: "In any trial in any
court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature
of the cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against
him." Id.
17. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d at 64, 436 N.E.2d at 486, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
18. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
19. Id. at 66.
20. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d at 64, 436 N.E.2d at 486, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
21. Id. at 65, 436 N.E.2d at 487, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
5
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Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt upon the
force of Sanders. In United States v. Inad2 2 the Supreme Court
limited Ohio v. Roberts, holding that the unavailability of a non-
testifying coconspirator need not be shown in order to admit
coconspirator declarations. 23 Bourjaily v. United States24 held
that since coconspirator hearsay statements fall within a firmly
established hearsay exception, a particularized showing of
trustworthiness for coconspirator statements is not constitu-
tionally required. 25 In other words, the Supreme Court has held
that the framework of Roberts, relied upon by Sanders, does not
apply to coconspirator statements. 26
Since the Federal Confrontation Clause now permits the
admission of coconspirator statements without a showing of
unavailability or a particularized showing of trustworthiness and
since Sanders stated that no reasons had been advanced "which
would cause us to recognize a state constitutional right of
confrontation broader than the Sixth Amendment guarantee as
interpreted by the Supreme Court," 27 it might seem that the state
confrontation clause does not require a showing of unavailability
and particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Even so, there
are some indications that the state provision does place those
particular restrictions on the admission of coconspirator
statements. Thus, even after Inadi and Bourjaily, the New York
Court of Appeals has still cited Sanders favorably in considering
the constitutional standards for admitting hearsay other than
coconspirator statements.28
22. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
23. Id. at 392-94 (explaining that Roberts "applies unavailability analysis
to prior testimony ... [and] cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical
proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government
without a showing that the declarant is unavailable").
24. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
25. Id. at 182.
26. Id.
27. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d at 64-65, 436 N.E.2d at 486, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
28. See People v. Ayala, 75 N.Y.2d 422, 432, 553 N.E.2d 960, 964, 554
N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (1990) (finding a constitutional violation because admitted
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Furthermore, in a well thought-out opinion, the Appellate
Division, First Department in People v. Persico,29 concluded that
the state constitution does place burdens on the admission of
coconspirator statements that the federal constitution does not.
30
Persico first noted that the New York Court of Appeals has not
repudiated Sanders.31 The court then concluded that "the co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule rests upon the shakiest
of theoretical foundations" 32 and often admits unreliable
hearsay. 33 Persico went on to hold that if the coconspirator
declarant were available, the declarant must be produced for the
statements to be admitted. 34 If the declarant is unavailable,
coconspirator statements can only be admitted if they are first
shown to be reliable. 35
Until the New York Court of Appeals reconsiders the questions
raised in Sanders, the foundation necessary for the admission of
coconspirator statements in New York remains unclear. A
number of recent cases, however, have held that it was error for
such hearsay to be admitted without a showing of unavailability
or reliability. 36 Thus, the proponent of coconspirator hearsay in a
New York state trial, in addition to establishing the requirements
for a coconspirator statement under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, that is, that the statement was made during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, would be safer producing the
29. 157 A.D.2d 339, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Ist Dep't 1990).
30. Id. at 345, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 347, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
33. Id. at 346, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
34. Id. at 349, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., People v. Porter, 179 A.D.2d 1018, 580 N.Y.S.2d 117 (4th
Dep't 1992) (stating that the trial court erred in admitting tile statement of a
coconspirator when neither the reliability nor unavailability had been
established); People v. Warren, 156 A.D.2d 972, 549 N.Y.S.2d 263 (4th
Dep't 1989) (stating that the court must decide whether the declarants are
unavailable and whether the statements bear some indicia of reliability
sufficient to justify admissibility).
7
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coconspirator declarant or showing that the declarant is not
available.
Furthermore, if the declarant is unavailable, the proponent
should show that the hearsay, in addition to satisfying the
elements of the coconspirator exception, also has special indicia
of reliability. What the appropriate indicia are, however, is not
clear. In Sanders, the New York Court of Appeals, in holding
that the particular coconspirator hearsay before it had the
necessary indicators of trustworthiness, listed five factors:
[The coconspirator] Brown's conversations with Goldberg were
memorialized on tape. As a result, there was no question at trial
that he actually uttered the statements in issue. Second, Brown
had personal knowledge concerning the matters about which he
spoke, and there is no possibility that his statements were based
on faulty recollection. Third, at the time these statements were
made, Brown had no motive to lie since he believed that he was
speaking in confidence to a cohort engaged in a joint criminal
enterprise .... Fourth, Brown's statements were independently
corroborated, to some extent, by defendant's conversations with
Goldberg, as well as by the events that [subsequently] tran-
spired .... Finally, the fact that these extrajudicial statements
directly implicated Brown in a joint criminal enterprise provides
additional assurance of their trustworthiness.
37
Another subsequent United States Supreme Court case,
however, casts into doubt whether all these factors can be used to
support a showing of the necessary indicia of reliability. In Idaho
v. Wright,38 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause requires that hearsay, not
falling within a firmly established hearsay exception, must have
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness in order for it to be
admitted against a criminal defendant. 39 The Court went on to
conclude that the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
must
37. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d at 65, 436 N.E.2d at 486, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
(citations omitted).
38. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
39. Id. at 815.
[Vol 11
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be drawn from the totality of the circumstances that surround the
making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief .... Thus, unless an affirmative reason, arising
from the circumstances in which the statement was made,
provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay
statement is not worthy of reliance at trial, the Confrontation
Clause requires exclusion of the out-of-court statement. 40
The Court specifically held that corroboration could not be
used to show that the hearsay had the necessary indicators of
trustworthiness. 4 1 Sanders, on the other hand, relied on
corroboration as one of the factors that showed the hearsay was
trustworthy. 42 Furthermore, Sanders relied on the fact that the
hearsay had been taped.43 While that tends to show that the
hearsay is accurately reported to the jury, it does not show that
the hearsay is trustworthy and would not support admission under
Wright.
Once again, until the New York Court of Appeals returns to
the issues raised in Sanders, it is unclear what factors will satisfy
a state-imposed indicia of reliability test for coconspirator
statements if, indeed, the New York Constitution does impose
such a requirement. Since it is unclear whether corroboration and
taping are still indicia of reliability, the proponent of a
coconspirator declaration should not rely on them to establish the
necessary reliability. Instead, the proponent ought to show that
the circumstances under which that particular out-of-court
statement was made indicate that the statement was likely to be
trustworthy. As Sanders indicates, the proponent may satisfy that
burden by showing circumstances demonstrating that the
particular declarant would not have had a faulty memory or
perception and was unlikely to be lying.44 Beyond that general
40. Id. at 820-21.
41. Id. at 823.
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conclusion, however, New York cases do not provide guidance
on how that burden might be satisfied.
There is another distinction between coconspirator statements
in New York and federal courts, and that is their relative use.
Federal courts see them much more often than the state courts
do. 45 This may be because conspiracy counts are included more
often in federal indictments than in state ones, but attorneys
should remember that conspiracy does not have to be charged for
coconspirator statements to be used. 46 Indeed, this hearsay is
admissible in civil as well as criminal cases. 47
Finally, it is noteworthy that both New York and the federal
system admit coconspirator statements and reform efforts have
not seriously sought to get rid of this doctrine. A convincing
argument for the reliability of this hearsay has not been
concocted. It was not even attempted for the Federal Rules of
45. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS - 1992 485 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1993) (indicating that
between 1980 and 1990, the crime of conspiracy was in a group of offenses
that constituted between 36% and 67% of the total criminal matters prosecuted
in U.S. District Courts); Paul Marcus, Defending Conspiracy Cases: Mission
Impossible?, 16 TRIAL, Oct. 1980, at 61 (suggesting that severe problems
persist in defending conspiracy cases, particularly in light of the frequency of
the conspiracy charge at the federal level).
46. See United States v. Durland, 575 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir. 1978)
(stating that "even though there is not a conspiracy charge, the [hearsay]
evidence is admissible where existence of the conspiracy is independently
established"); United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 1976)
(holding that "[tihe absence of a conspiracy count ... is without legal
significance in determining whether... [declarants' hearsay] statements were
admissible against ... [defendant]"); United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466,
471 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that the lack of a conspiracy charge in a case that
involved admission of coconspirator hearsay statements "is of no import").
47. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111,
1121 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that although "the overwhelming majority of
cases involving the admissibility of coconspirators' statements" involve
criminal proceedings, "construction of the requirements of Rule 801 (d)(2)(E)
was not based upon considerations unique to criminal actions"); Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("Although the vast majority of cases discussing the coconspirator exclusion
from the hearsay rule are criminal cases ... it is clear that the rule is equally
applicable to civil cases.").
[Vol 11
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Evidence. 4 8 One might expect, consequently, that codification
reformers would be targeting this archaism for elimination. If
there are such reform efforts, they have not generated much
attention. Proposed evidence codes for New York have not
suggested its abolition, and such elimination was never seriously
considered in the Federal Rules.
The lack of reform efforts for coconspirator statements is even
more striking when the biased nature of this doctrine is
considered. Although this hearsay can be admitted in civil cases,
48. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not justify the
exemption of coconspirator statements from the hearsay prohibition on the
grounds of reliability. "Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the
category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the
result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the
hearsay rule. . . .No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an
admission." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note. (citations
omitted) (footnotes omitted). See David S. Davenport, The Confrontation
Clause aiid the Coconspirator Erception in Criminal Prosecutions: A
Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1384 (1972) ("[The co-
conspirator exception has usually been supported by a variety of theories
unrelated to the trustworthiness of the evidence itself."), see also Christopher
B. Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action. Assertion, and
Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 335 (1984) ("[Mlodern commentators
have suggested that the [coconspiratorl exception exists largely because it is
necessary as a means of convicting conspirators. Since conspiracies are
dangerous to society and hard to prove at trial, a relaxation of the hearsay
doctrine is required. Courts occasionally find something in this view.").
Sometimes an agency theory is suggested to support this hearsay, but the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence concluded that -the agency theory of
conspiracy is at best a fiction.. . ." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)E) advisory
committee's note; Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 801d)2)(E) and the
Confrontation Clause: Closing the Window of Admnissibilitv for Coconspirator
Hearsay, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1296-98 (1985) This Note states that:
IA] fictional criminal agency theory is frequently used to justify Ithel
admissibility of alleged coconspirator's statements .... A more candid
explanation for the coconspirator exception is that coconspirator
statements are necessary tools for prosecuting conspiracies. which are
inherently covert and therefore difficult to prove .... Trustworthiness
problems with coconspirator statements.., remain manifold.
11
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it is most often used in criminal matters, and in criminal cases
only one side can introduce this hearsay.
The coconspirator rule allows admissibility for a statement that
"is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy." 49 While a declarant could, of course, be a
coconspirator of those working for the government, those
government agents are not the party-opponent of the accused.
The government is the party, and the government itself, as
distinguished from its employee, cannot be a coconspirator.
Thus, the declarant cannot be a coconspirator of the party-
opponent of the criminal defendant. As a result, the defendant
cannot introduce coconspirator admissions in a criminal case. 50
Perhaps, of course, it is the biased nature of this nonreliable
hearsay that has assured its continuance. If similar declarations
were admissible against the prosecutor, we might see a more
meaningful attempt to reform this hearsay doctrine.
III. FORMER TESTIMONY
The recent Second Circuit decision, United States v.
DiNapoli,51 raises many important issues including questions
about the neutrality of the evidence rules, how immunity grants
ought to be administered and used, and the power of the
prosecutor to hide information from the jury. But in keeping with
the themes here, I want to explore how it indicates that New
York and the Second Circuit are diverging in the former
testimony hearsay exception.
In DiNapoli, the United States Attorney, investigating a bid-
rigging scheme in the Manhattan concrete construction industry,
called before the grand jury two principals of a concrete
construction corporation who others had identified as part of the
49. Bouraily, 483 U.S. at 173.
50. Randolph N. Jonakait, Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for
Judicial Analysis and Reform, 67 UTAH L. REv. 87 (1992).
51. 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993).
[Vol 11
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illegal scheme. 52 Testifying before the grand jury, under a grant
of immunity, the two denied knowledge of the scheme.53
At trial, the defendants sought to call these two grand jury
witnesses to present their exculpatory information. 54 The
prosecutor, however, would not give them immunity for their
trial testimony, and each, claiming a privilege against self-
incrimination, would not testify. 55 The trial court then refused
the defense motion to admit the grand jury testimony. 56
On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that it did not have to
decide whether the grand jury testimony was admissible as
former testimony. 57 Whether or not the hearsay met the
requisites of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), the Second
Circuit held it was admissible because the witnesses were
available to the prosecution through a grant of immunity. 58
The Supreme Court, rejected this reasoning. The Court held
that the grand jury testimony could be admitted only if the
requirements of Rule 804(b)(1) were met.59 The hearsay was not
admissible simply because the prosecution could have made the
declarants available with an immunity grant. 60 The Court
remanded to the Second Circuit for a determination of whether
the former testimony exception was satisfied. 61
On remand, the Second Circuit held that the grand jury
testimony fell within Rule 804(b)(1), and therefore it should have
been admitted. 62 This was not the end, however. In an unusual
52. Id. at 910-11.




57. See United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 807 (2d Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 806.
59. United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2507 (1992).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2509.
62. United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1992).
13
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move, an en banc Second Circuit decided to hear the case and
reversed the panel decision.6
3
The en banc Second Circuit concluded that the grand jury
testimony was not admissible, because the government's motive
to develop the testimony at the grand jury was not "similar" to
its motive to develop such testimony at the trial. 64 The similar
motive requirement is not met, DiNapoli concluded, simply by
showing that the party at the prior proceeding had the opportunity
to develop the testimony and the issues at the two proceedings
were substantially similar. 65  Instead, "[t]he proper
approach ... in assessing similarity of motive under Rule
804(b)(1) must consider whether the party resisting the offered
testimony at a pending proceeding had, at a prior proceeding, an
interest of similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side
of a substantially similar issue." 66 Since the prosecution need
only meet a probable cause burden at a grand jury proceeding,
the prosecutor will not necessarily have the same motive in
developing the testimony at the grand jury as at trial.67 If
probable cause is established from other sources, the prosecutor
has little motivation to challenge the grand jury witness who
presents exculpatory information. 68 This was true in the
63. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc).
Anthony Salerno, a convicted defendant, died during the pendency of the
appeal.
64. Id. at 913-15. Under Rule 804(b)(1), former testimony is admissible if
the declarant is unavailable and "the party against whom the testimony is now
offered... had both an opportunity and a similar motive to cross-examine the
witness." Id. at 910.
65. Id. at 912; cf. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 304, at 519 (John William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (stating that "the courts look to the operative issue in
the earlier proceeding, and if basically similar and if the opportunity to cross-
examine was available, the prior testimony is admitted").
66. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914-15.
67. Id. at 913.
68. Id. The court stated that:
At the grand jury, the prosecutor need establish only probable
cause .... [B]y the time the exonerating testimony is given, such
probable cause may have already been established to such an extent that
there is no realistic likelihood that the grand jury will fail to indict. That
circumstance alone will sometimes leave the prosecutor with slight if
[Vol 11
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DiNapoli grand jury, where the Second Circuit concluded that the
motives of the prosecutor before the grand jury were not similar
to the motives of the prosecutor at trial. 69 Therefore, the similar
motive requirement of the former testimony hearsay exception
had not been met, and thus, the hearsay was not admissible. 70
Interestingly, criminal defendants have made the same
argument when claiming that the admission of testimony from
preliminary hearings at trials violates the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. 7 1 In essence, the defendant's arguments
have been that because a defendant does not have the same
motive to challenge witnesses at a preliminary hearing to
determine probable cause, testimony from that preliminary
hearing should not be constitutionally admitted at trial. 7 2 Indeed,
any motive to develop the exonerating testimony in order to persuade
the grand jurors of its falsity.
Id. If the Second Circuit is correct, one might ask why the witness presenting
the exculpatory information was called if the purposes of the grand jury had
already been satisfied.
69. Id. at 915.
70. Id. The court stated that:
ITIhe prosecutor had no interest in showing that the denial lat the grand
juryl of the Ibid-riggingl Club's existence was false. The grand jury had
already been persuaded, at least by the low standard of probable cause,
to believe that the Club existed and that the defendants had participated
in it to commit crimes.
Id.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The provision states in pertinent part: "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him .... " Id.
72. See, e.g., Bell v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, State of Ill., 847
F.2d 399, 400 (7th Cir. 1988) (criminal defendant claiming confrontation
clause violation due to admission at trial of unavailable witness' preliminary
hearing testimony); Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455. 457 (7th Cir. 1981)
(criminal defendant claiming testimony of an unavailable witness should not
have been admitted at trial on the ground that counsel was denied adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at preliminary hearing due to
procedural restrictions imposed); Gainer v. Jeffes, 1989 WL 14076 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (focusing on a criminal defendant claiming that an unavailable witness'
testimony should be excluded under the confrontation clause because counsel
was denied effective cross-examination at preliminary hearing).
15
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the defendants contended that there are affirmative reasons why
they should not truly challenge the evidence at the preliminary
hearing. True testing of the witnesses may not just waste time,
but may actually be harmful to the defendant because it might
reveal trial strategies thereby giving the witness and the
prosecution otherwise unavailable opportunities to prepare for
trial .73
The Supreme Court, in the confrontation context, has rejected
these arguments. 74 The Sixth Amendment is not violated by the
admission of preliminary hearing testimony at a trial when the
defendant had the opportunity to challenge the witness and
undertook some questioning at the hearing even if the motive
73. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 197 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). As Justice Brennan stated:
Cross-examination at the hearing pales beside that which takes place at
trial . . . .First, . . . the objective of the hearing is to establish the
presence or absence of probable cause, not guilt or innocence proved
beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, if evidence suffices to establish
probable cause, defense counsel has little reason at the preliminary
hearing to show that it does 'not conclusively establish
guilt. . . .Second, neither defense nor prosecution is eager before trial
to disclose its case by extensive examination at the preliminary hearing;
thorough questioning of a prosecution witness by defense counsel may
easily amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the State. Third, the
schedules of neither court nor counsel can easily accommodate lengthy
preliminary hearings. Fourth, . . .the defense and prosecution have
generally had inadequate time before the hearing to prepare for
extensive examination. Finally, though counsel were to engage in
extensive questioning, a part of its force would never reach the trial
factfinder, who would know the examination only second hand.
Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting).
74. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that admission
at trial of hearsay statements made during preliminary hearings, where the
declarant was unavailable to testify at trial, does not violate the confrontation
clause provided the statements bear some "indicia of reliability"); Green, 399
U.S. at 158 (holding that the confrontation clause is not violated by admitting
declarant's hearsay statements made at a preliminary hearing as long as the
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then was not "similar," as the Second Circuit now defines it, to
the cross-examination motive at trial. 75
The prosecutor at the DiNapoli grand jury had the opportunity
to challenge the exculpatory witnesses and, of course, did
question them. Even so, their testimony was not admissible
because of the similar intensity requirement. Thus, the Second
Circuit's former testimony requirement is narrower than the
confrontation standard. The rules of evidence, of course, can be
stricter than the Sixth Amendment requires, and that apparently is
the route chosen by the Second Circuit for former testimony.
This has implications beyond grand jury testimony. We should
ascribe neutral principles to the court and should assume that the
enunciated standard applies not just to organized crime
defendants seeking to admit grand jury testimony, but to all
former testimony. With the similar intensity test, preliminary
hearing testimony, although admissible consistently with the
confrontation clause, will now seldom be admissible at trial
against criminal defendants in the Second Circuit. 76 Seldom, if
ever, will the accused have a motive of similar intensity to cross-
examine a witness at the hearing as he would have at trial.77
75. Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66. As the Court stated: "Porter's preliminary
hearing testimony was admissible as far as the Constitution is
concerned .... [R]espondent had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter
[at the preliminary hearing] as to his statement .... [Tlhe right of cross-
examination then afforded [at the preliminary hearingl provides substantial
compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement. . ." Id.;
accord Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56 (1980).
76. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1993) (Pratt, J.,
dissenting). As Judge Pratt stated with respect to the majority decision finding
no similar motive upon application of the similar intensity test:
[The majority] applies a gloss to the language of rule 804(b)(1) that
would find a similar motive only when the party against whom the
testimony is offered had "an interest of substantially similar intensity to
prove (or disprove) the same side of a substantially similar
issue." . . . As a practical matter, the gloss effectively rewrites the rule
from "similar motive" to "same motive."
Id. (Pratt, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 916 (dissenting opinion by Judge Pratt suggests that "Inlot only
is the majority's test more stringent than the rule itself," but it also may prove
17
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New York, on the other hand, allows the admission of
preliminary hearing testimony whenever the minimal
requirements of the confrontation clause are satisfied. 78 All that
is necessary in New York is the opportunity for cross-
examination at a hearing which concerned the same subject as did
the later trial. 79 There is no similar intensity requirement.
[S]ince parties, at times-for tactical or other reasons--may, as
with a live witness at trial, choose not to cross-examine, it was
only a fair opportunity to do so which had to have been provided
when the former testimony was given .... The
record ... discloses that the right to cross-examine at the
preliminary hearing was not frustrated in any meaningful way. 80
New York following the confrontation standard broadly admits
preliminary hearing testimony from unavailable declarants. The
Second Circuit, applying a different standard, seldomly admits
preliminary hearing testimony. Once again, there is a difference,
perhaps fueled by the confrontation clause, between the
admission of hearsay in New York and federal courts.
But perhaps there is an even more important issue here. If
DiNapoli is correct, and former testimony is only trustworthy
when the similar intensity test is satisfied, then perhaps the
Supreme Court's confrontation standard for former testimony is
the wrong one. That issue, however, gets us far beyond our
purposes here, and so is a story for another day.
difficult to administer due to it requiring the district judge to compare a
prosecution "intensity of interest" at two different times).
78. See People v. Arroyo, 54 N.Y.2d 567, 431 N.E.2d 271, 446
N.Y.S.2d 910 (1982); People v. Hayes, 110 A.D.2d 1035. 489 NY.S.2d 19
(4th Dep't 1985); People v. Okafor, 130 Misc. 2d 536, 495 N.Y.S.2d 895
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1985).
79. Arroyo, 54 N.Y.2d at 574, 431 N.E.2d at 275-76, 446 N.Y.S.2d at
915 (finding preliminary hearing testimony is admissible at trial when there is
.an opportunity for... cross-examination [and the preliminary
hearing] ... delved into substantially the same subject matter as did the trial
on which it later was to be used").
80. Id. at 574-75, 431 N.E.2d at 276, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
[Vol 11
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Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you, Professor Jonakait. You are very kind in
characterizing the two opinions by the panel in the Second
Circuit as brilliant opinions, but the Supreme Court did not like
one of them, and not one of the other judges in the circuit, other
than the original panel, liked the second opinion. I agree with
you, the panel opinion was correct. However, it is not the law.
Professor Jonakait:
Who wrote those opinions?
Hon. George C. Pratt:
You are looking at him. I think this is fairly inferable from the
opinions. The second time around, the concern was far less with
the evidence aspects of the problem, than it was with the role of
the prosecutor and the manner in which grand jury proceedings
would be conducted.
The major complaint of the prosecutor in seeking en banc, was
that if this rule of the panel were to be in effect, that the mere
opportunity to cross-examine in the grand jury would be enough
to make grand jury testimony admissible at the request of the
defendants at trial. That would require the prosecutors to go
much further in their grand jury investigations than they
otherwise would do.
They come in, of course, they hide behind the secrecy of what
they do in the grand jury, but they say when we go in, we are
trying to do eighty-eight things at once. We have a witness before
us, we have a few targets, we have a few other people in mind
out there, we may or may not want to tip our cards at this point
by asking this witness a particular question because that might tip
off so and so out there and he would go hide some records and so
forth. We are a playing a mystical game here and nobody can
understand it but us and, therefore, do not tie our hands.
19
Jonakait: Coconspirator Statements and Former Testimony
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
I guess eight judges in our court agreed with that. Our concern
was more with the fairness in the outcome of the proceeding. We
followed the D.C. Circuit which says the motive in the grand
jury should be the same motive that he has with the trial, and that
is to find out what the truth is. They get the truth, let it all come
in and let the jury make that decision. It is that particular
philosophy, incidentally, that in my view is very significant with
respect to the coconspirator statements and the differences
between New York and federal practice.
The federal practice, it seems to me, has much greater faith in
what happened at the trial, in what juries do. The rules are more
liberal to get more information in front of the juries. In our
appellate procedures, we only look at the final result, there are
almost no interrogatory appeals.
In the state system you can look at it. I do not say this is the
actual motivation, but you can look at a great many of the rules
in the state system, both rules of evidence and rules of procedure,
that the appellate judges want to control what the outcome is. If
they can control what evidence goes in, make it more restrictive,
they will limit what inferences the jury might reasonably draw.
The same way if they can rule on a denial of a motion to dismiss
in a civil case, they are controlling the trial judge.
To me, I tend to look at it as how much do you trust juries.
There are a lot of people, like my law professors and colleagues
at Yale, who think and refer to juries as twelve good hod
carriers. I came out of law school thinking you can never trust a
jury because they do not know what they are doing. In my own
practice, it was rare that I ever got a jury. In fact, during my
twenty years as a trial lawyer, I only tried four cases with a
twelve-person panel.
When I went on the bench though, it was a rude awakening, a
brilliant awakening, with how sensitive and conscientious and in
many ways brilliant juries are. I have the utmost faith in what a
jury will do given good trial lawyers who will develop a case at
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